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Subsoil natural resource endowments and associated 
rents²if well harnessed and managed²can serve as 
a boon to developing countries. Yet, too often, the 
extractive industries of oil, gas, and mining have 
been associated with the ³resource curse´whereby 
nations that are more dependent on nonrenewable 
natural resources grow more slowly than resource-
poor countries and often suffer from weaker 
governance and institutional quality.i In many 
developing countries, natural resources are the main 
game in town²and the extractive industries sector is 
both shaped by and, in turn, influences political, 
economic, societal, and institutional dynamics. 
Understanding the political economy of resource 
rents is therefore crucial to achieving sustainable 
development built on resource riches. 
As global demand for natural resources grows²and 
in response to historically high commodity prices²
the push for new discovery and intensified extraction 
KDVLQFUHDVLQJO\PRYHGLQWR³IURQWLHUDUHDV´LQWKH
developing world. Although the bulk of resource 
rents are currently generated in higher income 
settings, almost a quarter of global extractive 
industries rents accrue to low-income and lower 
middle-income settings (Figure 1). A breakdown of 
rent flows by region (Figure 2) shows the increasing 
significance of the developing world¶s participation 
in the extractive industries. Although the Middle East 
has maintained its leading position in terms of rents 
derived from petroleum, its share of global extractive 
industry rents has decreased since 2000. Conversely, 
East Asia and the Pacific¶s share grew from 9 to 17 
percent of total natural resource rents; and between 
2000 and 2008, Sub-Saharan Africa¶s natural 
resource rents increased sixfold, with oil rents 
representing more than two-thirds of the total.ii In 
short, rents from natural resources are becoming 
more important in the developing world, where poor 
governance and weak institutional quality makes 
countries vulnerable to the resource curse.  
Figure 1: Extractive industry rents by income level, 2008 
 
  







































































Figure 2: Extractive Industry Rents by Region, 2000±08 
(US$ billions)  
  
Source: Wealth of Nations Database (World Bank 2011). 
From the public interest perspective, many resource-
dependent developing countries pursue short-sighted, 
suboptimal policies regarding the extraction and 
capture of resource rents and spending and savings 
from their resource endowments. This note attempts 
to make sense of these outcomes and suggest better 
policies at each step in the natural resource 
management (NRM) value chain by focusing on two 
central political economy dimensions: the degree to 
which governments can make credible intertemporal 
commitments to both resource developers and 
citizens and sustain durable pacts sector policies, and 
the degree to which governments are inclusive and 
inclined to turn resource rents into public goods and 
sustainable development outcomes.  
Much has been learned about the economics and 
associated policy options of natural resource-led 
growth. The commodity boom and bust cycle of the 
1970s focused attention on these issues in the 
international development community.iii Today, 
historically high commodity prices and the growing 
importance of extraction in many developing 
countries underlie a renewed interest in policy issues 
pertaining to natural resource-led development and a 
number of measured policy options for natural 
resource-led growth have been advanced.iv Yet, for 
the most part, scholars and practitioners have fallen 
VKRUWRIWUDQVODWLQJEURDGDJUHHPHQWRQ³JRRG
SUDFWLFH´SROLFLHVLQWRFRQFUHWHVWHSVWRQDYLJDWHDQG
address the institutional and political obstacles 
associated with extracting and allocating resource 
rents for developmental purposes.  
This analysis emphasizes instead WKHQRWLRQRI³JRRG
ILW´²taking the position that welfare-promoting 
policies, institutions, and governance must be 
WDLORUHGDWOHDVWLQSDUWWRDFRXQWU\¶VVSHFLILF
context. Adopting an approach to institutional 
arrangements that emphasizes local variation and 
innovation as much as best international practice, will 
be central to the ability of governments and 
development partners to achieve salutary 
developmental outcomes.v Thus, this note presents an 
analytical framework for assessing a country¶s 
political economy and institutional environment as 
they relate to natural resource management and, on 
that basis, it offers targeted recommendations across 
the natural resource value chain that are technically 
sound and compatible with the identified underlying 
incentives.  
The Natural Resource Management 
Value Chain   
Natural resource management spans many specific, 
interrelated decisions made by governments in 
interaction with resource developers (private and 
state-owned) and society. The World Bank has 
adoptHGD³YDOXHFKDLQDSSURDFK´WRXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
NRM, with the primary objective of prescribing an 
integrated set of feasible policy interventions to 
transform natural resource potential into sustainable 
development outcomes. The value chain (Figure 3) 
encompasses the institutional arrangements across 
five key dimensions of NRM: (1) sector organization 
and the award of contracts and licenses; (2) 
regulation and monitoring of operations; (3) 
collection of taxes and royalties; (4) revenue 
distribution and public investment management; and 
(5) implementation of sustainable development 
policies.vi 
Figure 3: The Natural Resource Management Value 
Chain   
 
Source: Mayorga Alba 2009. 
The NRM value chain spans the key sequence of 
steps that a resource-dependent country must 
undertake in transforming its natural resource rents 
into developmental riches. When embedded in a 
political economy context, the value chain also offers 
the potential for a comprehensive assessment of the 
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affect a resource-GHSHQGHQWFRXQWU\¶V ability to 
transform rents into riches.  
  
Box 1. Typical Paradoxes in Natural Resource Management 
 
Extracting Resource Wealth 
The paradoxes involved in devising models of ownership and allocation of extraction rights in the natural 
resource sector include the following: 
x The predictability of policy and the regulatory framework surrounding the natural resource sector is 
essential to salutary developmental outcomes, yet it is common for governments to seek to retain 
discretion to change the rules of the game.  
x Contract negotiations in the hydrocarbon and mineral sectors are characterized by asymmetric 
capacity and information between the parties, but the relative bargaining power between 
governments and investors shifts over the lifecycle of extractive industry projects.  
x Resource rents have the potential to allow governments expand the amount of public goods they 
provide without imposing additional taxes; but a tension exists around a private versus public 
calculus in decision-making around ownership of natural resources, one that is intensified because of 
the stakes involved. 
Taxing Resource Wealth 
The paradoxes involved in designing tax policy and the administrative instruments used for natural resource 
revenue collection include the following: 
x Despite having weak revenue administration governance and capacity, many low-income resource-
rich countries resort, in practice, to overly complex, multi-rate fiscal regimes.  
x Developing countries use generous tax incentives to compensate investors for high levels of risk and 
to attract resources to develop extractive industries; nevertheless, their inability to sustain such 
commitments over time further deteriorates their credibility and discourages investment in the sector. 
x Mineral resources provide countries with considerable rents and relative administrative ease²since 
taxing these resources requires less effort than taxing other economic activities²but many resource-
dependent countries neglect basic investments in revenue administration capacity that could increase 
public revenue and allow for more a progressive and flexible fiscal regime, precisely as a result of 
the incentives generated by the sector. 
Investing Resource Wealth 
The paradoxes involved in deciding how natural resource revenues should be distributed to the citizenry and 
transformed into productive economic assets include the following: 
x Resource rents offer the prospect of investing heavily in physical infrastructure that would generate 
high returns in capital-scarce countries, but such countries often fail to invest proactively in the 
processes and systems needed to yield the very best projects as a result of political incentives and the 
features of the sector. 
x Investment in public infrastructure is one of the policy tools that resource-dependent countries can 
use as the basis for economic diversification and reduced cyclicality; nonetheless, public investment 
tends to be highly pro-cyclical, thus unsustainable. Failure to maintain projects generates repeated 
³EXLOGQHJOHFWUHEXLOG´HSLVRGHV 
x A benevolent national planner would ideally allocate resource rents to finance the highest return 
public investment projects, regardless of their geographic location; but political economy dynamics 
often militate toward earmarking investments to the location of resource extraction or fragmenting 
them across various narrower political constituencies. 
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Experiencing the Resource Paradox 
Practitioners in resource-dependent countries face 
many of the same challenges of poor policy making, 
limited capacity, and weak institutions as developing 
countries in general. Yet significant factors 
distinctive to resource-dependent settings shape the 
political economy context and can condition the 
overall development process in specific ways: in 
particular, the finite nature of hydrocarbons and 
minerals; the supernormal profits yielded by resource 
H[WUDFWLRQDQGWKHVWDWH¶VVRYHUHLJQULJKWto some 
portion of those rents; the fact that commodity prices 
are extremely volatile and, from the perspective of 
most developing countries, are set exogenously; and 
the uniqueness and long timeframe of the extraction 
or production cycle and ownership structures in the 
resource sectors. Together, these distinctive qualities 
position resource rents as central to the political 
economy of resource-dependent settings and make 
the extractive industries particularly vulnerable to 
problems of intertemporal credibility. 
Viewed through the lens of the empirical experiences 
of low-income, resource-dependent countries, it is 
more useful²in both analytical and practical terms²
to speak of a set of ³resource paradoxes´ rather than 
a resource curse. From an operational perspective, the 
generation, taxation, and distribution of rents is 
conditioned by key government choices in terms of 
policies and institutions: What models of ownership 
are used in the sector and how are extraction rights 
allocated? How should tax policy be designed and 
what administrative instruments should be used to 
collect revenue? How should resource revenues be 
distributed to the citizenry and transformed into 
productive economic assets? The research for Rents 
to Riches identified typical NRM paradoxes that 
beset resource-dependent developing countries, as 
listed in box 1. Together, these paradoxes provide a 
picture of the formidable challenges low-income 
countries face as they attempt to transform resource 
rents into sustainable development riches. The 
analysis presented in the remainder of this note 
provides greater detail on the dynamics of these 
paradoxes and proposes potential interventions to 
resolve them.  
Transforming Rents into Riches    
1DWXUDOUHVRXUFHV\LHOG³UHQWV´²or extraordinary 
profits from their production²that are crucial to the 
political economy of resource-led development. 
Viewing natural resource rents flows through the 
disaggregated lens of the NRM value chain, two key 
issues emerge in characterizing how a government 
manages its natural resources: (1) How effectively 
does a government generate and capture rents from 
the extractive industries? (2) How does the 
government spend resource wealth and to what extent 
is it invested in a sustainable, pro-development 
manner? In essence, outcomes across the NRM value 
chain can be reduced to two core rent arenas: 
generating rents through extraction and taxation and 
distributing rents through spending and investment 
(Figure 5). Many different domestic and international 
stakeholders are involved in natural resource policy 
making and extraction, and the relationships among 
these actors are constantly shifting across the value 
chain. 
)LJXUH7KH7ZR.H\µ5HQW$UHQDV¶LQWKH1DWXUDO
Resource Value Chain 
 
Source: Barma et al. 2012, p. 11, based on Webb 2010. 
Political economy scholarship often relies on regime 
typologies to distinguish why certain types of country 
settings yield certain outcomes.vii In order to help 
country counterparts and development practitioners 
diagnose the political economy trajectory a resource-
dependent country is embarked upon, this volume 
advances a simple typology that is structured around 
two crucial dimensions: 
x The credibility of intertemporal 
commitment²or the degree to which policy 
stability and bargains over time can be 
enforced and deviations from such 
agreements are subject to sanction; and  
x The overall political inclusiveness of the 
prevailing state-society compact²or the 
extent to which diverse social, economic, 
and political viewpoints are incorporated 
into decision-making, and a sense of either 
collectivist or clientelist welfare is 
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Source:  Barma et al. 2012, p. 12, adapted from Barma and 
Viñuela 2010. 
Although these dimensions are interdependent to 
some extent, positioning them against each other 
yields a typology of four distinct country settings, 
each with distinctive implications for natural resource 
rent generation and allocation.  
x Patrimonial rule: political-economic settings 
characterized by individualized political authority, 
usually resting on a hierarchy of cronyism, where 
the exercise of power faces few constraints. These 
can be settings of persistent instability and a high 
degree of political contestation with frequent 
turnover among conflicting groups, or they can be 
characterized by dictators who avoid establishing 
organizational arrangements that constrain their 
actions (such as an institutionalized ruling party). 
These ³roving bandits´ are typically unlikely to 
make credible intertemporal commitments or 
protect property rights because they are 
unconstrained.viii In settings of patrimonial rule, 
extractive capacity is low, constant theft from 
society means economic production is low, time 
horizons are short, and the exploitation of public 
resources for private gain is common. 
x Hegemonic government: an uncontested, 
institutionalized political force or one-party 
regime²or stationary bandit²that successfully 
monopolizes ³theft´ through regular taxation and 
provides, in turn, peaceful order and some degree 
of public goods for society. Hegemonic 
governments can appear either predatory or 
relatively benevolent.ix Time horizons are 
lengthened due to regime stability; combined with 
greater institutionalization, this enables credible 
intertemporal commitment. 
x Clientelist pluralism: political-economic settings 
where some degree of political competition takes 
place (mainly through electoral contests), usually 
on the basis of extensive patron-client networks. 
The need to reward supporters results in some 
public goods provision; but the reliance on 
clientelist distribution of particularist goods to 
mobilize support undermines vertical and 
horizontal accountability and has self-enforcing 
characteristics that lead to the under-provision of 
public goods that enhance collective welfare. 
Time horizons are short because politics are 
relatively unpredictable, and the degree of 
institutionalization (and hence constraint on 
power) is low. 
x Programmatic pluralism: electoral competition on 
the basis of programs that are geared toward 
collective welfare enhancement, with an emphasis 
on society-wide public goods provision. A higher 
degree of institutionalization brings with it built-
in democratic mechanisms of horizontal and 
vertical accountability, facilitates the articulation 
and protection of property rights, and enables 
credible intertemporal commitment. 
,QVXPPDU\DFRXQWU\¶VSRVLWLRQLQJDORQJWKHWZR
key dimensions captured in the typology²the 
credibility of intertemporal commitment and degree 
of political inclusiveness²determines how  
stakeholder incentives and the institutional landscape 
interact with the structural characteristics of natural 
resources and hence how a country actually 
experiences the resource paradox. In noninclusive 
settings where the intertemporal credibility of 
commitment is low, rent generation will be weak 
because the state will find it difficult to make 
beneficial extractive bargains with resource 
developers, and rent allocation will be biased toward 
consumption by political-economic elites and away 
from saving and investment for society. Factors that 
make intertemporal commitments more credible²by 
lengthening time horizons and strengthening 
institutionalization and the enforcement of property 
rights²will tend to improve a country¶s performance 
in terms of rent generation by enabling governments 
to strike better deals, at a lower risk premium, with 
developers. Factors that increase political 
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inclusiveness²incorporating more political, social, 
and economic groups into decision making²will 
make the state more accountable to society and will 
orient rent allocation toward collective welfare 
through the provision of public goods and investment 
for sustainable development. 
Benchmarking Country Context 
Cross-country governance indicators can provide an 
initial benchmarking of country context 
(https://www.agidata.org/). While all indicators are 
subject to potential measurement bias and error, a 
number of accessible indicators are publicly available 
to benchmark a country¶s ability to make credible 
intertemporal commitments and its degree of political 
inclusiveness. To illustrate how analysts and 
practitioners may characterize the institutional 
environment in their country of interest, Figure 6 
plots a proxy for ³LQWHUWHPSRUDOFUHGLELOLW\´XVLQJWKH
³SROLF\FRRUGLQDWLRQLQGLFDWRUVIURPWKHPublic 
Policy Attributes databaseDQGDSUR[\IRU³SROLWLFDO
LQFOXVLYHQHVV´XVLQJWKH³participation in political 
GHFLVLRQV´ indicator from the French Development 
Cooperation Institutional Profiles Database.x. 
Political economic dimensions are inherently difficult 
to measure, and there is no substitute for careful 
country-by-country analysis. The more data sources 
that are examined and triangulated, the more robust 
and reliable any quantitative assessment will be; a 
more qualitative assessment is always useful in 
combination with quantitative indicators²especially 
if particular discrepancies across data sets remain, or 
if the quantitative characterization appears to be 
strikingly inaccurate.  
Figure 6: Intertemporal Credibility and Political 
Inclusiveness 
 
Source: Barma et al. 2012, p. 67, Institutional Profi le Database 
(2009) for ³political inclusiveness´ and Public Policy Attributes 
Database (2008) for ³intertemporal policy coordination.´ 
Emerging Intervention s for 
Addressing the Resource Paradox   
The structural characteristics of resource 
dependence²especially the very rapid availability of 
large windfall rents, the concentration of ownership 
and decision making in the sector, and the often 
unrivaled access to rents for those with political and 
economic power²tend to push resource-dependent 
developing countries into a setting of patrimonial rule 
or else to entrench regimes in hegemonic 
government. This is suggested by the cumulative 
body of scholarship on the political economy 
dynamics associated with natural resource wealth.  
Development interventions to mitigate the resource 
curse are aimed at assisting reform in countries such 
that their policy-making and institutional framework 
across the natural resource value chain approximate 
those to be found in countries squarely within the 
ideal of programmatic pluralism. In other words, 
natural resource rents are most reliably transformed 
into sustainable development riches when a 
government can make credible intertemporal 
commitments to both the extractive companies and its 
citizens, and when the political regime is inclusive 
such that the government has incentive to use 
resource rents to provide public goods that enhance 
collective welfare.  
Using a political economy framework for 
understanding outcomes in natural resource 
management points to two interrelated principles for 
enhancing the developmental orientation of the 
sector:  
i. Adopt a good-fit approach to natural resource 
management by tailoring interventions to context 
and;  
ii. Emphasize the incentive compatibility of 
interventions such that they support and nudge 
stakeholders into making developmentally 
oriented decisions at each step of the value chain.  
Orthodox approaches to natural resource 
management that seek to impose best practice 
arrangements in the sector often miss the distinct 
policy priorities and reform opportunities in 
particular countries. A good-fit approach is inherently 
contingent on context and hinges on the view that 
building functional institutional capability matters 
more than achieving specific institutional forms to do 
so. And it rests on a clear understanding of 
stakeholder motivations in designing incentive-
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compatible interventions. In other words, a good-fit 
approach narrows the gaps between expectation and 
reality with regard to interventions, aiming to deliver 
improved outcomes through incentive-compatible 
entry points and institutional designs. 
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Source: Barma et al. 2012, p. 233. 
The technical chapters on sector organization, 
revenue mobilization, and public investment in Rents 
to Riches examine the specifics of NRM practices, 
highlighting how institutions, incentives, and 
stakeholders combine and interact with resource 
extraction, taxation, and spending, and presenting 
options for development interventions. Table 2 
summarizes some of the emerging key principles for 
resource-dependent developing countries in these 
three areas, mapped against the political economy 
settings of patrimonial rule, hegemonic government, 
and clientelist pluralism²namely those characterized 
by significant weakness in terms of intertemporal 
credibility or political inclusiveness, or both.xi These 
good-fit interventions are layered against political 
economy contexts such that they ameliorate the 
adverse effects of weak intertemporal credibility and 
low political inclusiveness. In most cases, the 
interventions are elaborated as actions that resource-
dependent governments could take to enhance 
resource extraction, taxation, and investment²any of 
these could be bolstered and enhanced by support 
from donors and partnerships with extractives 
investors and other stakeholders, including civil 
society groups.  
Three basic types of incentive-compatible 
intervention are possible across the value chain. 
Some interventions are aimed primarily at extending 
time horizons, thereby enhancing intertemporal 
credibility. Other reforms emphasize mobilizing 
stakeholders in order to enable collective action in 
natural resource management, thereby broadening 
political inclusiveness. A third form of intervention is 
slightly different: it enclaves institutions and capacity 
in NRM so that some, albeit limited, functionality is 
possible even when the wider political economy 
dynamics are perverse. Rents to Riches provides a 
more in-depth treatment in the three chapters on 
extraction, taxation, and investment.  
Ultimately, the best and surest trajectory of natural-
resource-led development is to engage as many 
global, national, and community-level stakeholders as 
possible in defining the public interest and in holding 
decision makers accountable for achieving that goal. 
7KLVYROXPH¶V political economy framework 
demonstrates that where intertemporal credibility is 
weak and political inclusiveness low, political 
economic elites are able to siphon resource rents 
away from developmentally oriented outcomes. The 
implications for engagement are clear: lengthening 
time horizons enhances the ability of governments to 
increase potential rent generation, and improving 
political inclusiveness supports the orientation of rent 
distribution towards the collective good. The logic of 
the framework, along with the case material 
presented throughout this book, thus demonstrates the 
potential for mediating the resource paradox through 
intelligent and resilient institutional design. 
Successful development interventions must work 
within the constraints of, resonate with, and 
eventually shape, the underlying political and 
institutional dynamics associated with resource-
dependence. Bearing that in mind, diverse 
stakeholders oriented by the normative compass of 
collective welfare enhancement can successfully 
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Notes                                                                                                                           
This note is based on Naazneen H. Barma, Kai Kaiser, Tuan Minh 
Le, and Lorena Viñuela, Rents to Riches? The Political Economy 
of Natural Resource-Led Development (Washington DC: The 
World Bank, 2012). This note summarizes the key messages of the 
volume, focusing on the political economy framework developed 
therein.  
i Sachs and Warner (1995; 2001) are credited with a seminal 
empirical statement of the resource curse that demonstrates this 
paradoxical relationship between resource dependence (measured 
by the raw material export share of GDP) and growth. Subsequent 
cross-sectional empirical research indicates that the quality of 
existing institutions may be the key factor that mediates a resource-
GHSHQGHQWFRXQWU\¶VHFRQRPLFRXWFRPHV6HHDPRQJRWKHUV
Dunning (2008); Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik (2006); Sala-i-
Martin and Subramanian (2003); Vatansever and Gillies (2009).  
ii Background notes provide a more in-depth analysis of recent 
extractive rents, investment, and discovery, with a special 
emphasis on developing countries: Gelb, Kaiser, and Viñuela 
2011; Kaiser and Viñuela 2011a; b. 
iii See Gelb and Associates (1988) for a foundational statement. 
iv See Brahmbhatt and Canuto (2010) for a recent summary of 
major issues. Collier, van der Ploeg, and Venables (2009) and 
Frankel (2010) survey some of the recent work in this area, 
positioning findings in the context of how the literature on the 
resource curse has evolved over time. The World Bank (2010) 
provides insights concerning commodity-led development more 
EURDGO\ZLWKVSHFLDOUHIHUHQFHWR/DWLQ$PHULFD³*RRGSUDFWLFH´
approaches to better harnessing extractive resources for 
development include Asher (1999); Humphreys, Sachs, and 
Stiglitz (2007); Collier (2009; 2010); and the Natural Resource 
Charter (2009).  
v Rodrik (2003; 2007) has advocated this perspective eloquently. 
vi Mayorga Alba (2009) provides a complete description of the 
technical components embedded in the EI value chain.  
vii The typology presented here is adapted from foundational work 
by Naazneen Barma and Lorena Viñuela (Barma and Viñuela 
2010). Phil Keefer provided insights into refining the typology 
(Keefer and Vlaicu 2007; Gehlbach and Keefer 2009; 2010). The 
typology particularly builds on the typological and theoretical 
work of Eifert, Gelb, and Tallroth (2002); Evans (1989; 1995);  
Kohli (2004); Lal and Myint (1996); and Olson (1993). 
viii Olson (1993) develops the concepts of roving and stationary 
bandits in articulating a theory of economic development under 
dictatorship and democracy. One of the key characteristics that 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
distinguishes a political economy setting under a stationary bandit 
(or institutionalized regime) from that under roving bandits 
(leaders who are unconstrained by organizational arrangements) is 
that the time horizons are longer in the former (see Clague et al. 
1996). The intertemporal dimension of our typology hinges on this 
elegant insight.  The authors thank Phil Keefer for his observations 
on this concept.   
ix The degree to which the regime needs to pay off other social 
groups (usually with a mix of particularistic and developmental 
goods) can vary and relates to the predictability of succession and 
the potential of revolt. In Angola, for example, the ruling elite was 
able to enrich itself with relative inattention to broader societal 
demands; whereas in Suharto era Indonesia, a certain degree of 
broad-based growth and development was necessary to underwrite 
WKHUHJLPH¶VJULSRQSRZHU 
x The Public Policy Attributes (PPA) dataset of the Inter-American 
Development Bank is available at 
http://www.iadb.org/res/pub_desc.cfm?pub_id=DBA-008 (see also 
Berkman et al. 2008).  
The Institutional Profiles Database (IPD) developed under the 
auspices of the French Development Cooperation is available at 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/institutions.htm (see also 
Crombrugghe et al. 2009). 
xi Programmatic pluralist settings face less constraining political 
economy dynamics. 
